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Comment
When Does Parental Liability End?: Holding
Parents Liable for the Acts of Their
Adult Children
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 20, 1988, Laurie Wasserman Dann entered a Winnetka,
Illinois school and opened fire on a second grade classroom. She
killed one child, Nicky Corwin, and injured five others. Laurie
Dann left many questions unanswered when she killed herself later
that day. One unanswered question, which was before the court in
the case of Corwin v. Wasserman,' is whether parents can be held
liable for the acts of their adult child.
The Corwins contended that the Wassermans knew of their
daughter's dangerous propensities. Specifically, it was alleged that
the Wassermans knew that their daughter had made death threats,
set fires, and was reported to have stabbed her ex-husband.2 The
Corwins also asserted that the Wassermans controlled every aspect
of Laurie Dann's life. The Wassermans, it was alleged, decided
where Dann lived, managed her finances, and controlled her con-
tacts with the community.' Despite this control and knowledge of
her dangerousness, the Corwin's claimed that the Wassermans
made no effort to protect society from their daughter.' The
Corwins further alleged that, under these circumstances, the Was-
sermans are liable for negligence.
The Wassermans argued that they are not liable for the acts of
their adult, emancipated child. They contended that, legally, a
parent can take control of their adult child only through a court
order.6 The Wassermans state that, because they were not their
daughter's court-appointed custodians, they are not liable for her
1. No. 88 L 16369 (Il1. Cir. Ct. filed Sept. 8, 1988).
2. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 17, Corwin v. Wasser-
man (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Sept. 8, 1988) (No. 88 L 16369) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Response].
3. Id. at2.
4. Id. at 19.
5. Id. at 1-2.
6. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 18, Corwin v. Wasserman (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed
Sept. 8, 1988) (No. 88 L 16369).
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Parental liability for acts committed by their children is an
evolving area of the law. This Comment focuses on whether par-
ents of an adult child can be held liable for that child's acts. This
Comment traces the history of parental liability, by examining leg-
islative and judicial measures used to hold parents liable for the
acts of their minor children: specifically, parental responsibility
statutes and section 316 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The
Comment also discusses how section 319 of the Restatement,
which imposes liability on those taking charge of dangerous per-
sons, may be expanded to apply to parents of a child beyond mi-
nority age. Finally, the Comment analyzes the moral and public
policy problems of expanding parental liability by the use of sec-
tion 319.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Common Law and Parental Liability Statutes
At common law, the mere relationship of parent and child did
not impose liability on parents for their child's torts." This rule
came under attack, however, because children rarely have many
assets. A rather serious problem of uncompensated juvenile torts
resulted.9
Every state legislature has enacted, in some form, a parental lia-
bility statute.'0 These statutes address the problem of uncompen-
7. Id. at 21. The court denied the Wassermans' motion to dismiss. Corwin v. Was-
serman, No. 88 L 16369 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 28, 1989) (denial of defendant's motion to
dismiss); see infra text accompanying notes 110-20.
Judge Donald P. O'Connell of the Circuit Court of Cook County informed the author
that the parties in Corwin v. Wasserman have reached a tentative settlement agreement.
The settlement will not be subject to appellate review. Terms of the settlement were not
disclosed. Interview with Judge Donald P. O'Connell, Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois (Nov. 19, 1990).
8. 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 123 (1978).
9. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 123 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS]. As one court stated:
One of the more inscrutable holdovers from the ancient establishments of the
common law is the historically ubiquitous idea that a parent who has visited
upon the world a tort-inflicting child ought not to be held financially responsi-
ble for the torts that the child has in turn visited upon those of us unfortunate
enough to have gotten in the way.
Snow v. Nelson, 450 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
10. See Scott, Liability of Parents for Conduct of Their Child Under Section 33. 01 of
the Texas Family Code: Defining the Requisite Standards of "Culpability", 20 ST.
MARY'S L. J. 69, 87-92 (1988) (appendix contains each state's parental liability statute).
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sated juvenile torts by imposing a duty on parents to pay for the
injuries caused by their minor child. Parental liability statutes
were enacted primarily to compensate innocent victims and curtail
juvenile delinquency."' To recover under a typical statute, the in-
jured party must prove that the minor child committed a malicious
or wilful tort. 2 The amount of damages recoverable under these
statutes ranges from several hundred to several thousand dollars.13
In California, for example, the statute allows recovery up to$10,000.14 Texas allows the plaintiff to recover up to $15,000 plus
court costs and attorney fees.' 5 Wyoming restricts recoverable
damages to $300,16 whereas Pennsylvania allows a $300 recovery
per person, with a maximum recovery of $1000 regardless of the
number of people injured.' 7
Initially, not every state accepted this expansion of liability. For
example, in Corley v. Lewless,' s the Georgia parental liability stat-
ute successfully was challenged on state and federal constitutional
grounds. The Georgia statute provided for parental liability with-
out a limit on the amount of damages recoverable.' 9 The Georgia
Supreme Court stated that to allow any recovery on the basis
stated by the statute would deprive the defendant of property with-
out due process of law, authorize a recovery without liability, and
compel payment without fault.20
Parental liability statutes are an abrogation of the common law
because they impose liability on parents without regard to the par-
ents' fault. As a result, many courts believe that the damages im-
posed by these statutes should be restricted to protect the parents
11. See Note, The Iowa Parental Responsibility Act, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1037, 1039
(1970).
12. Id. at 1040.
13. See Scott, supra note 10, at 87-92.
14. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.1 (Deering 1988).
15. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.01-33.02 (Vernon 1986).
16. WYO. STAT. § 14-203 (1986).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2002-4 (Purdon Supp. 1988); see also Scott, supra note
10, at 90.
18. 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971).
19. The Georgia statute that was overturned in Corley stated:
Every parent, or other person in loco parentis, having the custody and control
over a minor child or children under the age of 17 shall be liable for the wilful
and wanton acts of said minor child or children resulting in death, injury or
damage to the person or property, or both, of another.
GA. CODE ANN. § 105-113 (1966).
20. Corley v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 750-51, 182 S.E.2d 766, 770 (1971) (quoting
Lloyd Adams, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 190 Ga. 633, 641, 10 S.E.2d 46, 51 (1940)).
Georgia subsequently revised its parental liability statute to include limits on the amounts
recoverable. See GA. CODE ANN. § 105-113(a) (Harrison 1984).
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from unlimited liability. Parental liability statutes nevertheless
survive, as long as their purpose falls within the constitutional
scope of legislative powers.2 ' A legislature, under its police power,
may enact laws reasonably necessary to prevent manifest evil, or to
preserve the public safety or general welfare.22 The legislative
power to create statutory parental liability cannot be justified, how-
ever, if it allows unlimited recovery from the parents. Thus, paren-
tal liability statutes must strike a balance between the need to
address the problem of uncompensated juvenile torts and the real-
ity that these statutes impose liability without fault. Therefore,
these statutes generally provide limited compensation for injuries
caused by minor children, but do not impose strict liability on
parents.23
B. Section 316 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
Parental responsibility statutes were the first step taken to im-
pose liability on parents for the acts of their children. Although
these statutes are useful to plaintiffs who seek recovery for damages
due to vandalism or minor injuries, limits on the amount recover-
able make them inadequate to address more serious torts.
In an effort to offer adequate compensation for serious injuries
committed by minors, a second exception to the common law rule
was created. Fourteen states expressly adopted section 316 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.24 Section 316 imposes a duty on a
21. See, e.g., Alber v. Nolle, 98 N.M. 100, 105, 645 P.2d 456, 461 (Ct. App. 1982)
(New Mexico statute upheld because the limited liability imposed was within the legisla-
tive police powers).
22. Imposing statutory liability that is within the scope of legislative authority, and
that accords with the statute's purpose, does not violate substantive due process. Id.
23. The New Mexico Court of Appeals, for example, distinguished its statute, which
places a pecuniary limit on parental liability, from the Georgia statute at issue in Corley:
"The Georgia statute was held unconstitutional because it 'seeks to provide compensation
in full for property damage or for personal injury ... solely on the basis of the parent-
child relationship' even though 'the parent was entirely free from negligence or fault
.... .Id. (citations omitted).
24. See Britton v. Cann, 682 F. Supp. 110 (D. N.H. 1988); Doe v. United Social &
Mental Health Servs., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Conn. 1987); Daggett v. County of
Maricopa, 160 Ariz. 77, 770 P.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1989); Boyd v. Connell, 293 Ark. 531,
739 S.W.2d 536 (1987); Robertson v. Wentz, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1281, 232 Cal. Rptr. 634
(1986); Lahey v. Benjou, 759 P.2d 855 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Basler v. Webb, 188 Ill.
App. 3d 178, 544 N.E.2d 60 (1989); Bowling v. Popp, 536 N.E.2d 511 (Ind. Ct. App.
1989); Smith v. Shaffer, 395 N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 1986); Reinert v. Dolezel, 147 Mich.
App. 149, 383 N.W.2d 148 (1985); Cashman v. Reider's Stop-n-Shop-Supermarket, 29
Ohio App. 3d 142, 504 N.E.2d 487 (1986); Vance v. Thomas, 716 P.2d 710 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1986); Carey v. Reeve, 56 Wash. App. 18, 781 P.2d 904 (1989).
Section 316 is entitled "Duty of Parent to Control Conduct of Child" and provides:
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minor child's parents to use reasonable care in preventing their
child from injuring others. Accordingly, this liability is based on
the parents' negligence in controlling their minor child, who in
turn injured the plaintiff.25 Section 316 allows an injured party to
sue for a greater amount of damages than under the original paren-
tal liability statutes. Since there is no limit to the monetary recov-
ery under section 316, courts can award damages that are sufficient
to compensate the plaintiff.
Section 316 liability attaches upon proof that the parents had:
(1) notice of past harmful conduct by the child, and (2) an oppor-
tunity to control their child, but failed to do So. 2 6 Although one
court insists that the imposition of section 316 liability, based on
parental negligence, must come from the legislature, 27 no other
court has followed its reasoning.
1. Defining "Notice of Harmful Conduct"
Although many states have adopted section 316, they disagree
about its application. Under section 316, a complaint must allege
specific instances of prior conduct that are sufficient to put the par-
ents on notice that the act complained of was likely to occur.28
The disagreement centers upon whether a parent needs prior notice
of the specific conduct that caused the injury, or simply notice that
the child's general misconduct could lead to an injury.
Some courts have held that the specific conduct that caused the
injury must have been habitual,29 or at least similar to the minor's
A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so as to control his minor
child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others or from so conducting
itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the child,
and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising
such control.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
25. Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill. App. 3d 184, 200, 478 N.E.2d 603, 613 (1985).
26. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 9, § 123.
27. "We believe that a decision whether to adopt a doctrine of parental neglect is
more properly left to the legislature because of the many societal and policy considera-
tions which necessarily bear upon such a decision." Bell v. Hudgins, 232 Va. 491, 495,
352 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1987).
28. Kosrow v. Smith, 162 Ill. App. 3d 120, 124, 514 N.E.2d 1016, 1019 (1987) (quot-
ing Campbell v. Haiges, 152 Ill. App. 3d 246, 504 N.E.2d 200 (1987)).
29. See Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1955) (complaint dismissed because
there was no allegation that the child had previously injured anyone by slamming a door
on them); Shaw v. Roth, 54 Misc. 2d 418, 282 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (complaint
must allege that parents had knowledge of the child's vicious and malicious disposition
and a habit of assaulting).
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prior misconduct. 30 This theory of parental liability is the most
difficult to prove.
The Florida Supreme Court applied this theory in Gissen v.
Goodwill.31 In Gissen, the court dismissed a complaint by a hotel
employee who brought suit against the parents of an eight-year-old
girl who severed the employee's finger when she slammed a door
on it. The plaintiff alleged that the parents carelessly and negli-
gently failed to restrain their child despite their full knowledge of
previous acts committed by their daughter at the hotel, such as
knocking down and damaging objects of furniture, and disturbing
and harassing the guests and employees of the hotel.32  In dis-
missing the suit, the court stated that a cause of action against par-
ents under section 316 must allege that the parents knew of their
child's habitual harmful conduct and failed to guard against it.33
The concern reflected by Gissen is that parents should be held
liable only if the injury was foreseeable to the parent, thereby en-
suring that there is "no general responsibility for rearing incorrigi-
ble children. ' 34  A parent's mere knowledge of the child's
mischievous and reckless disposition, according to this theory,
does not suffice to render a parent liable.35
Other courts have held that a parent who knows of a child's
vicious tendencies should be liable, even though the specific wrong-
ful conduct was not known to be habitual.36 This theory is the
least stringent standard by which parental liability may be im-
posed. Courts using this theory are concerned with protecting vic-
tims, even if the parents have only a general knowledge of their
child's propensity to injure.37 These courts argue that excluding all
30. See Pesek v. Discepolo, 130 111. App. 3d 785, 787, 475 N.E.2d 3, 4 (1985) (no
allegation that the parents had knowledge of any prior acts of violence committed by
their son that would make a rape foreseeable); Linder v. Bidner, 50 Misc. 2d 320, 270
N.Y.S.2d 427 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (in order to hold that a parent had notice of a child's
dangerous habit, the dangerous habit must be of a very specific kind).
31. 80 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1955).
32. Id. at 702.
33. Specifically, the court stated:
Before a cause of action may be stated against the parents for the tort of a child
there must be alleged a specific known course of conduct by the minor involving
his habitual, intentional and specific wrongful acts against others and the par-
ents' failure to take proper precautions to guard them against such acts.
Id. at 705.
34. Linder v. Bidner, 50 Misc. 2d 320, 322, 270 N.Y.S.2d 427, 430 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
35. See Gissen, 80 So. 2d at 704.
36. See, e.g., Parsons v. Smithey, 109 Ariz. 49, 53, 504 P.2d 1272, 1276 (1973);
Snow v. Nelson, 450 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
37. See, e.g., Parsons, 109 Ariz. at 53, 504 P.2d at 1276. In dismissing the argument
that the case law involving parental liability demands that the parents have notice of a
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but specific similar acts to prove knowledge leads to ironic results.
As pointed out by one court, "parents of incorrigible children are
lucky if their children are versatile in their wrongdoing. If their
children lack ingenuity in their devilment, the parents may be held
liable." '38
Some courts take an intermediate approach. These courts re-
quire evidence of past behavior that would lead reasonable parents
to conclude that their child could injure another if not controlled.39
Under this approach, allegations of prior misconduct are insuffi-
cient to put the parents on notice of a child's dangerousness if the
misconduct is not related in any way to the conduct that caused
the injury.4°
2. Ability to Control
The second element necessary to impose liability under section
316 is the parent's opportunity and subsequent failure to control
the child.41 The absence of this ability to control is fatal to a claim
of legal responsibility.42 Because a parent's ability to control may
be inferred as to a very young child,43 and usually is inferred as to a
minor child,' it is not usually an issue in a section 316 case. If the
child is not a minor, however, neither control nor the duty to im-
pose that control is assumed under section 316. If the child is an
adult, the imposition of parental liability must come from a differ-
ent source.
child's habitual conduct, the Supreme Court of Arizona stated, "[w]e do not read these
cases as mandating that knowledge can only be proved by prior acts of the same or simi-
lar type." Id.
38. Snow, 450 So. 2d at 274.
39. See, e.g., Parsons, 109 Ariz. at 54, 504 P.2d at 1277.
40. See, e.g., Robertson v. Wentz, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1281, 232 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1986)
(knowledge of son's drug use and disciplinary problems at school did not make shooting
foreseeable); Pesek v. Discepolo, 130 Ill. App. 3d 785, 475 N.E.2d 3 (1985) (knowledge of
son's truancy, drinking, and criminal acts did not make rape foreseeable); Shaw v. Roth,
54 Misc. 2d 418, 282 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (knowledge of son's drinking problem
did not make assault foreseeable); Moore v. Crumpton, 55 N.C. App. 398, 285 S.E.2d 842
(1982) (knowledge of drug use, truancy, and rebellious behavior did not make rape
foreseeable).
41. "The ability to control the child, rather than the relationship as such, is the basis
for a finding of liability on the part of a parent." Robertson, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1290,
232 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill. App. 3d 184, 199, 478 N.E.2d 603, 612
(1985) (mother's control over her three-year-old son was inferred).
44. See, e.g., Robertson, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1290, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 638 (ability to
control minor may be disproved by particular circumstances, such as the mother having
legal custody but not physical custody prior to the misconduct).
1990]
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Because Laurie Dann was beyond minority age at the time of her
violent acts, the Corwins could not rely on section 316. The
Corwins relied, instead, on section 319 of the Restatement.45 This
novel use of section 319 attempts to expand upon the common law
exceptions developed under parental liability statutes and section
316. Parental liability statutes create a cause of action against par-
ents that was prohibited under common law. Section 316 increases
the amount of damages recoverable from parents who fail to con-
trol their violent minor children. Now, by using section 319, the
scope of parental liability may be expanded to hold parents liable
for the acts of their adult children.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Historical Use of Section 319
An essential element in any negligence action is the defendant's
legal duty to the plaintiff. Under common law, a person has no
legal duty to prevent a third party from causing physical injury to
another.' Section 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is an
exception to this general rule.
Section 319 imposes a duty on one who takes charge of a person
whom he knows or should know is likely to cause bodily harm to
others if not controlled. This exception primarily has been used to
impose liability on government agencies,4" such as the police48 and
parole boards,49 and against private institutions, such as rehabilita-
45. Plaintiff's Response, supra note 2, at 15-26. Section 319 is entitled "Duty of
Those In Charge of Persons Having Dangerous Propensities" and states: "One who
takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause
bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to
control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965). The Corwins' complaint also relied on § 324A, which
imposes a duty to use reasonable care on one who undertakes a service to protect others
from his charge. See id. § 324A.
46. Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 188 (D. Neb. 1980).
47. See, e.g., Abernathy v. United States, 773 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1985) (suit against
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Indian Health Services for negligent release of patient
who killed a third person); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb.
1980) (Veterans hospital named as third-party defendant after former patient shot two
people, killing one); Ryan v. State, 150 Ariz. 549, 724 P.2d 1218 (1986) (suit against the
Arizona Youth Center for a killing committed by an escapee).
48. See, e.g., Crider v. United States, 885 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1989); Phillips v. City of
Billings, 758 P.2d 772 (Mont. 1988) (both suits against park rangers for failure to restrain
an intoxicated driver who subsequently injured others).
49. See, e.g., Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1981) (parole board held
liable due to negligent failure to read records that would have shown parolee's dangerous
propensity); Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976) (third-party com-
plaint against probation officer granting indemnification). But see, e.g., Fitzpatrick v.
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tion centers,50 hospitals,5' and psychiatric centers.5 2 The only pri-
vate individuals on whom section 319 liability has been imposed
are psychotherapists.53 Using section 319 to impose liability on
families for the acts of their adult members is a new, unproven
extension of this common law exception.5 4
Because the use of section 319 to impose a duty on families is so
limited, one must look at the rationale that courts have used in
applying section 319 in cases against psychotherapists. Further-
more, it must be examined whether that rationale is appropriate
when parents, not psychotherapists, are the defendants.
State, 439 N.W.2d 663 (Iowa 1989) (absent a special relationship, parole officers not lia-
ble to victim); Small v. McKennan Hosp., 403 N.W.2d 410 (S.D. 1987) (section 319 does
not apply to members of pardon and parole boards or parole officers); Fox v. Custis, 236
Va. 69, 372 S.E.2d 373 (1988) (no duty absent a special relationship).
50. See, e.g., Nova Univ., Inc. v. Wagner, 491 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1986) (child care
institution for children with emotional and behavioral problems has a duty to exercise
reasonable care in controlling the children); Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 250 Ga.
199, 296 S.E.2d 693 (1982) (negligent failure to exercise proper control over patient).
51. But see, e.g., Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hosp., 119 Ill. 2d 496, 520
N.E.2d 37 (1988) (no duty to restrain an informally admitted patient who threatened
hospital personnel with a knife, and fled the hospital and killed another person in a high
speed chase with police); Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. and Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d
507, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987) (duty to warn of drug's effects is owed only to the patient, not
to the public at large); Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 39 Ohio St. 3d 86, 529 N.E.2d
449 (1988) (psychiatrist will be held liable only if he did not act in good faith in discharg-
ing a patient).
52. See, e.g., Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976) (court order
suspending sentence on condition that probationer remain confined in the institute im-
posed a duty on institute to protect public by maintaining custody of probationer). But
see, e.g., Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989) (no duty to control conduct toward
unforeseeable victim).
53. See Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (psychiatrist held liable for failure to warn the potential victim of his
patient after patient told the therapist that he would kill her); see also infra notes 55-61
and accompanying text. But see Brady v. Hopper, 570 F.. Supp. 1333 (D. Colo. 1983) (no
duty to warn if patient made no specific threat against a specific victim); see also infra
notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
54. See Megeff v. Doland, 123 Cal. App. 3d 251, 176 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1981) (suit
against wife and daughter for their husband/father's attack dismissed due to lack of prior
dangerous conduct by him); Alva v. Cook, 49 Cal. App. 3d 899, 123 Cal. Rptr. 166
(1975) (suit against sisters who cared for mentally ill brother who killed a third person
was dismissed due to lack of foreseeability); Sego v. Mains, 41 Colo. App. 1, 578 P.2d
1069 (1978) (suit against son who had custody of mentally ill mother was dismissed be-
cause son had no notice that mother could be dangerous); Clark v. McKerley, 126 N.H.
778, 497 A.2d 846 (1985) (parents not liable for son's act of setting a fire when there was
no evidence that parents should have known of child's dangerous propensity). But see
Estate of Mathes v. Ireland, 419 N.E.2d 782 (Ind. App. 1981) (claim against custodial
mother and grandparents for killing committed by adult son was a valid cause of action).
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B. Use of Section 319 Against Psychotherapists
In the 1976 landmark case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univer-
sity of California,5 the California Supreme Court ruled that a psy-
chotherapist incurs a legal obligation to warn an intended victim if
that warning is essential to avert danger. 56  The plaintiffs in
Tarasoff were the parents of Tatiana Tarasoff, who was killed by
Prosenjit Poddar. The Tarasoffs sued the university regents, doc-
tors, and campus police for the murder of their daughter by Pod-
dar, who was a patient of the psychologists employed by the
university hospital.
Two months before the murder, Poddar had told his therapists
that he intended to kill an unnamed girl when she returned home
from her summer in Brazil. 57 The girl was readily identifiable as
Tatiana. The doctors notified campus police and requested their
assistance in locating Poddar.5 8 The campus police took Poddar
into custody, but, satisfied that he was rational, released him on his
promise to avoid Tatiana. The director of psychiatry then ordered
that no action be taken to place Poddar in the evaluation facility.
No one warned Tatiana of her peril,-and shortly after her return
from Brazil, Poddar went to her residence and killed her. 9
The California Supreme Court analogized a psychotherapist's
duty to warn to the recognized duty of a physician to warn the
carrier of a contagious disease, or a driver whose condition or med-
ication affects his ability to drive safely.6° The court concluded
that a psychotherapist also has a duty to warn if he knows that his
patient's behavior may threaten the safety of others.6'
Although a number of courts have followed Tarasoffs reason-
ing,62 many courts have limited the circumstances in which a duty
55. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
56. Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
57. Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 433, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
60. Id. at 436-37, 551 P.2d at 343-44, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24.
61. Id. at 437, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
62. See, e.g., Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980) (the
relationship between the patient and therapist is sufficient to support the imposition of an
affirmative duty on the defendant for the benefit of a third person); Williams v. United
States, 450 F. Supp. 1040 (D.S.D. 1978) (failure of Veterans Hospital to notify county
authorities of patient's discharge was negligent); Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo.
1988) (imposing a duty on a psychotherapist to forsee potential dangerousness before
releasing patient from involuntary commitment); Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 250
Ga. 199, 200, 296 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1982) (independent duty falls upon physician to exer-
cise that control with such reasonable care as to prevent harm to others at the hands of
the patient); see also, Cooke v. Berlin, 153 Ariz. 220, 228, 735 P.2d 830, 838 (Ct. App.
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to warn will be imposed on a psychotherapist. 63 Courts tradition-
ally have struggled to define the type of conduct needed to bring
the therapist within the standards of section 319. The plaintiffs in
Corwin v. Wasserman needed to prove that the Wassermans took
charge of their daughter, and that harm to others was foreseeable.
1. Proving that the Defendant Took Charge
To impose on a person a duty to control a third person's acts,
one must show that a special relation exists between the two peo-
ple.6 Recognized special relations include: the duty of a parent to
control his minor child; 65 the duty of a master to control his ser-
vants;66 the duty of a landowner to control his licensee; 67 and the
duty of those in charge of persons having dangerous propensities.68
The cases that impose liability for failure to control the conduct of
a third party exhibit similar factors that support the imposition of
a duty. Each of these cases involves a person in need of special
supervision or protection and someone in a superior position who
is able to provide it.69
Dependency, however, is only half of the special relation; the
other half is the right to intervene or to control the actions of the
third party.7° In Tarasoff, the court found that a right to control
existed even though the patient was being treated as an outpa-
tient. 71 Many courts, however, have been unwilling to find this ele-
ment of the special relation unless the patient was committed
1987) (Corcoran, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) ("view[ing] the duty owed
to others by a psychotherapist as a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect anyone
who might reasonably be endangered by their patient").
63. See, e.g., Currie v. United States, 836 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1987) (duty to warn runs
only to identifiable persons in recognizable zone of danger); Brady v. Hopper, 570 F.
Supp. 1333 (D. Colo. 1983) (no duty to warn if patient made only nonspecific threats of
harm directed at nonspecific victims); Cooke v. Berlin, 153 Ariz. 220, 735 P.2d 830 (Ct.
App. 1987) (duty to warn is not imposed based solely on psychotherapist-patient
relationship).
64. Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 39 Ohio St. 3d 86, 92, 529 N.E.2d 449, 455
(1988) (there is no duty to control the conduct of another unless a special relation exists
between the actor and that person).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
66. Id. § 317.
67. Id. § 318.
68. Id. § 319.
69. Bowling v. Popp, 536 N.E.2d 511, 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted).
70. Id. (parents of party hosts had no right to intervene and control intoxicated
guest).
71. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 436, 551 P.2d 334, 343,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 (1976); see also supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
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involuntarily. 72 These courts found that the control element of sec-
tion 319 is satisfied only when a psychotherapist or a hospital had
complete control over the patient by confinement.
Gradually, more courts are approaching Tarasoffs broad rea-
soning and imposing a duty on psychotherapists, even if the con-
trol of the patient is not by involuntary commitment.7 a In Lipari v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co.,74 the duties imposed on a psychiatrist were
expanded beyond those stated in Tarasoff. The United States was
named as a third-party defendant in Lipari because the patient,
who injured the plaintiff and killed her husband, had been receiv-
ing psychiatric care through the Veterans Administration. Lipari
stated that, although Tarasoff concerned only the issue of a thera-
pist's duty to warn, Tarasoffs language made it clear that the na-
ture of the precautions to be taken depends on the circumstances. 7
Lipari found that if a psychiatrist determines that his patient
presents a serious danger of violence to another, the psychiatrist
incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect potential vic-
tims against such danger. 76 In Lipari, the court held that the Vet-
72. See, e.g., Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198, 1216 (Colo. 1989). In Perreira, the
court found that a psychiatrist's control over an involuntarily committed patient's free-
dom and length of commitment was sufficient to impose a corresponding duty on the
doctor. The court also stated, however, that involuntary commitment creates a "special
relationship substantially different in kind from the relationship existing between a treat-
ing psychiatrist and a voluntary patient." Id.; see also Beck v. Kansas Univ. Psychiatry
Found., 580 F. Supp. 527, 534 (D. Kan. 1984) (since psychiatrist had control over pa-
tient's release, imposition of duty was proper); Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial
Hosp., 119 Ill. 2d 496, 508, 520 N.E.2d 37, 42 (1988) (to impose a duty to protect third
parties, an institution must have custody of a dangerous person through a court order or
adjudication that gives them actual control over the individual). Cf Brady v. Hopper,
570 F. Supp 1333, 1335 (D. Colo. 1983) (therapist-outpatient relationship lacks sufficient
elements of control, and therefore is not a special relationship); Kosrow v. Smith, 162 Ill.
App. 3d 120, 125-26, 514 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (1987) (voluntarily giving shelter to
houseguest is not a special relationship, therefore no recognized duty to protect public
from him exists); Bowling v. Popp, 536 N.E.2d 511, 516 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (parents
had no right to arrest or means to control party guest, so no duty imposed); Krejci v.
Akron Pediatric Neurology, Inc., 31 Ohio App. 3d 273, 274, 511 N.E.2d 129, 131 (1987)
(physician has no control over patient who is not institutionalized).
73. See, e.g., Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 196-97 (D. Neb.
1980) (Veterans Hospital negligent in failing to detain dangerous patient); Littleton v.
Good Samaritan Hosp., 39 Ohio St. 3d 86, 92, 529 N.E.2d 449, 455 (1988) (psychiatrist
found to have special relation with voluntarily hospitalized patient, but the court did not
decide whether a psychiatrist's duty extends to the outpatient setting); see also Cooke v.
Berlin, 153 Ariz. 220, 227-28, 735 P.2d 830, 837-38 (Ct. App. 1987) (Corcoran, J., dis-
senting) (imposition of duty appropriate because psychotherapist takes charge of patients
by accepting them as outpatients and undertaking their treatment).
74. 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
75. Id. at 193.
76. Id.
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erans Administration was negligent f6r failing to detain the patient,
and that its negligence contributed to the plaintiff's injuries and
her husband's death. 7 As a result, the psychiatrist incurred a duty
to detain his patient because injury to another was foreseeable. 78
Tarasoff and Lipari have expanded section 319 to include indi-
vidual defendants under an exception historically used solely
against the government or other institutions.79 Now, in cases such
as Corwin v. Wasserman,8" plaintiffs are seeking to expand section
319 by imposing on parents a duty to control their adult children
who are likely to harm others. Since section 319 liability is not
based on a familial relationship, the basis for finding liability must
be the parents' ability to control their adult child."'
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Estate of Johnson v. Condell Me-
morial Hospital,82 limited the situations in which control may be
inferred under section 319. Johnson emphasized the necessity of
court-appointed physical custody before section 319 appropriately
can be applied. s3
The plaintiff in Johnson was the estate of a woman killed when
her car was struck by police who were chasing a violent hospital
patient." The estate alleged that the hospital knew of the patient's
violent propensity and negligently failed to provide adequate secur-
ity to control the patient.8 ' The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court's dismissal of the complaint because there were no
allegations that the hospital had the required court order or adjudi-
cation that gave them actual control.86
77. Id at 196-97.
78. Id at 193.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 46-52.
80. No. 88 L 16369 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Sept. 8, 1988); see also supra text accompanying
notes 1-7; infra 122-24, 137-40.
81. See Megeff v. Doland, 123 Cal. App. 3d 251, 261, 176 Cal. Rptr. 467, 472-73
(1981) (natural relationship between father and daughter creates no inference of an ability
to control; actual custodial ability must be shown). But see Mathes v. Ireland, 419
N.E.2d 782, 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (Hoffman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (parent cannot take control of an adult child without a court determination).
82. 119 Il. 2d 496, 520 N.E.2d 37 (1988).
83. Id at 506, 520 N.E.2d at 41 (a patient who is in the hospital's custody only
through involuntary admission is free to leave upon her request); see also Kirk v. Michael
Reese Hosp. and Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 530, 513 N.E.2d 387, 398 (1987) (duty
imposed on physician having physical custody).
84. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d at 499, 520 N.E.2d at 37-38.
85. Id at 500-01, 520 N.E.2d at 38.
86. Id. at 508, 520 N.E.2d at 42.
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2. Foreseeability of Harm
Beyond proving that the defendant had the requisite control,
section 319 also requires that the defendant had sufficient notice of
the dangerous propensities of his charge. The probable harm to
others must be foreseeable. Thus, one who takes charge of another
person must control that person if he knows that bodily harm to
others is likely. Similar to the problems encountered in defining
foreseeability under section 316,7 courts have struggled in defining
"one who is likely to harm." '
Predicting who has dangerous propensities and is likely to harm
another person has proven very difficult. Many courts have stated
that, because psychiatrists are unable to predict their patient's po-
tential for violence with any degree of accuracy, a therapist's liabil-
ity must be limited to specific threats against identifiable people.89
The issue of foreseeability was discussed in Brady v. Hopper.'
The three plaintiffs in Brady were injured by John Hinckley's at-
tempted assassination of President Reagan in 1981. The defendant
was Hinckley's former psychiatrist who had recommended that
Hinckley not be hospitalized.9' The plaintiffs argued that the psy-
chiatrist had a duty to warn Hinckley's parents because it was fore-
seeable that Hinckley would be violent. The court ruled that,
because Hinckley lacked a history of violence, it was not foresee-
able that he would injure the plaintiffs. Hinckley's psychiatrist,
therefore, had no legal obligation to protect the plaintiffs. 92 The
87. See supra text accompanying notes 28-40.
88. See Ryan v. State, 150 Ariz. 549, 552, 724 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Ct. App. 1986) (dis-
tinguishing the phrase "likely to cause harm" from mere "potential for harming").
89. See Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1339 (D. Colo. 1983) ("[h]uman behav-
ior is simply too unpredictable, and the field of psychotherapy presently too inexact, to so
greatly expand the scope of therapists' liability"); Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 39
Ohio St. 3d 86, 93-94 n.4, 529 N.E.2d 449, 456 n.4 (1988) (psychiatrists cannot predict
patients' potential for violence); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,
461, 551 P.2d 334, 361, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 41 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("psychiatrist does
not enjoy the benefit of overwhelming hindsight in seeing which few, if any, of his pa-
tients will ultimately become violent").
90. 570 F. Supp. 1333 (D. Colo. 1983).
91. Id. at 1334-35.
92. Id at 1338-39. The court stated:
[T]he existence of a special relationship does not necessarily mean that the du-
ties created by that relationship are owed to the world at large. It is fundamen-
tal that the duty owed be measured by the foreseeability of the risk and whether
the danger created is sufficiently large to embrace the specific harm. It is this
requirement of foreseeability which has led numerous courts to conclude that a
therapist or others cannot be held liable for injuries inflicted upon third persons
absent specific threats to a readily identifiable victim.
Id. at 1338.
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court accordingly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss.93
The issue of foreseeability arose in the context of family liability
in Megeff v. Doland.94 The defendants in Megeff were the wife and
daughter of a man named Stevens who had stabbed the plaintiff.
The wife and daughter were sued for negligently failing to exercise
control over Stevens.95 The court did not discuss directly the issue
of taking control, but implied that section 319 was applicable if the
incident was foreseeable. 96
The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the de-
fendants because the wife and daughter did not know Stevens to be
a violent man.97 His only prior aggressive behavior was directed
toward an intern and a nurse as they attempted to confine him to
the hospital.98 The court reasoned that such an incident may have
created a foreseeable risk that Stevens might attack a person trying
to confine him to a place other than his home, but it was not fore-
seeable that he would attack anyone else.99
Megeff alluded to the fact that section 319 may impose a duty to
control a family member, but only if the injury is foreseeable.
Some decisions, however, interpret foreseeability very narrowly as
a pretext for refusing to find liability.
In A Iva v. Cook," for example, the California Court of Appeals
refused to impose liability on family members, because the injury
allegedly resulting from their failure to control a dangerous relative
was not foreseeable.101 The plaintiffs sued on behalf of Edward
Alva, who was shot and killed by sixty-year-old Malcolm Pink-
ston, when Alva drove into the defendants' driveway in an attempt
to turn his car around. The defendants were Pinkston's sisters,
who had provided a home for Pinkston for a number of years. 102
Pinkston was unable to provide for himself because he was
psychotic. 103 Nevertheless, the defendants allowed their brother to
93. Id. at 1339.
94. 123 Cal. App. 3d 251, 176 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1981).
95. Id. at 256, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
96. Id. at 257, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
97. Id. at 258, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
98. Id. at 255, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
99. "One incident of physical aggression while hospitalized (a stressful situation) pre-
cipitated by the staff insistence that he remain, hardly clothes Charles Stevens with a
propensity for violence likely to be directed against plaintiffs." Id. at 260, 176 Cal. Rptr.
at 472.
100. 49 Cal. App. 3d 899, 123 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1975).
101. Id. at 904-05, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
102. Id. at 902, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
103. Id. at 903-04, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
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keep a high-powered rifle, which, the plaintiffs alleged, constituted
negligence.1° 4 The plaintiffs presented evidence of Pinkston's his-
tory of hospitalization for mental illness and his arrest twelve years
earlier for assault with intent to kill his brother. 05
The court dismissed this evidence as insufficient notice of Pink-
ston's dangerous propensity. Specifically, the court found nothing
to suggest that a firearm had been used in the prior assault.0
6
Pinkston had attacked his brother with an intent to kill, but be-
cause he did not use a rifle in the assault, the court felt that the
sisters could not reasonably have foreseen his attack on Alva. Ac-
cordingly, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit.
The Alva court expressed its concern over the societal and moral
implications that would result if families were liable for the acts of
their adult relatives."0 7 Instead of relying on the public policy is-
sues and the impact that accompanies the imposition of liability on
families, however, the Alva court based its decision on a tortured
interpretation of foreseeability.
C. Taking Charge of an Adult Child
Using section 319 to impose a duty on parents is complicated by
the demand of proving that the parents took charge of their adult
child. It is difficult to distinguish between a parent taking charge
of an adult child, and a parent simply caring for his child. This
complication was the basic issue in Corwin v. Wasserman. The
Corwins argued that parents can take charge by their control over
the adult child's life. They argued that parents have the duty to
take affirmative actions if they know that their adult child, of
whom they have taken charge, is likely to injure others. The Was-
104. Id. at 904, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
105. Id. at 909, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
106. Specifically, the court stated:
Nothing is alleged by way of probative or ultimate fact which impels or suggests
•.. that Pinkston had been or was dangerous to himself or others. No attempt
is made to allege that Pinkston ever used a rifle as a means of assault or at-
tempted assault ... on any occasion.
Id. at 904-05, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
107. The court responded:
Certainly no moral blame can be attached to the conduct of the sisters because
they accepted the burden and responsibility of caring for a brother who legally
possessed a rifle with no history of its use or abuse ....
On the record before us we are satisfied that it would be unjust and morally
wrong and against public policy to discourage humane and natural relationships
between members of a family who are sensitive to and generous in the treatment
of less fortunate members of their family.
Id at 907, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
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sermans argued that, before section 319 liability can be imposed,
the parents must be the court-appointed legal custodians of their
child. 08
The Corwins' complaint alleged that the Wassermans had the
duty to control their daughter under section 319.109 The Was-
sermans moved to dismiss based on the holding in Estate of John-
son.110 The Wassermans maintained that they acted as concerned
parents for a confused daughter; therefore, their actions did not
constitute custodianship sufficient to impose a duty under section
319.1 1 This argument adopts the reasoning of court decisions that
impose a duty on a psychotherapist only when his patient is com-
mitted involuntarily.1 1 2 These cases recognize the difficulty of
proving control based solely on a relationship without a legal de-
termination assigning control.
The Corwins argued that the Wassermans' control over their
daughter is evidenced by the control that they exercised over every
aspect of her life.1 1 3 The Corwins pointed to the fact that the Was-
sermans provided their daughter's residence, controlled her per-
sonal assets, provided her financial support, directed her
psychiatric treatment, and negotiated with victims of her theft and
vandalism to avoid criminal prosecution.'1 4 Furthermore, the
Corwins argued, the Wassermans convinced the police that they
had sufficient control over their daughter to control her use of her
gun.1 1 5 The Corwins contended that this conduct shows the Was-
sermans' control over Dann; therefore, a legal determination of
control is not required to impose a duty under section 319.116
The Corwins' reasoning is supported by cases such as Tarasoff
and Lipari, which find that a special relationship can exist absent
legal or physical custody.' Duty is imposed, these cases reason,
based on the dependency of the dangerous person and the foresee-
ability of harm, not on physical control. The psychotherapist, in
turn, incurs an obligation to initiate whatever precautions reason-
108. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 6, at 18.
109. Plaintiff's Response, supra note 2, at 14-26.
110. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 6, at 18; see also Estate of Johnson v.
Condell Memorial Hosp., 119 Ill. 2d 496, 520 N.E.2d 37 (1988); supra text accompanying
notes 82-86.
111. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 6, at 22.
112. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
113. Plaintiff's Response, supra note 2, at 19.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 71-78.
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ably are necessary to protect potential victims of his patient." 8
The Corwins argued that a similar duty should be imposed on par-
ents who have taken charge of their adult child's life and who are
aware that their child's dangerous propensities present an unrea-
sonable risk of harm to others. The Circuit Court of Cook County
agreed with the Corwins and denied the Wassermans' motion to
dismiss.' 19
In the prior cases holding a family liable under section 319, the
courts have based their decisions on the foreseeability of injury. 2 '
It seems, therefore, that courts are more willing to base their deci-
sions on foreseeability than on the parents' duty or ability to con-
trol their adult child.' 2 ' A possible explanation for the courts'
refusal to base family liability on lack of control is the public policy
issues inherent in that decision. If section 319 is to be used suc-
cessfully to hold parents liable for the acts of their dependent adult
children, the courts must address whether a parent can take charge
of an adult child. The courts must discuss and decide whether the
moral and societal prohibitions are outweighed by the need for pa-
rental liability.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Public Policy and Psychotherapist Liability
In denying the Wassermans' motion to dismiss, Judge Donald P.
O'Connell of the Circuit Court of Cook County ruled that Illinois
118. Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 193 (D. Neb. 1980).
119. Corwin v. Wasserman, No. 88 L 16369 (III. Cir. Ct. June 28, 1989) (denial of
defendant's motion to dismiss).
The court found particularly disturbing the allegation that the Wassermans both
"knew of [Laurie Dann's] possession of firearms and ammunition" and "fostered that
possession by providing money for the purchase of firearms and ammunition." Record of
Proceedings at 29-30, Corwin v. Wasserman (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 8, 1989) (hearing on de-
nial of defendant's motion to dismiss). Further, the Wassermans allegedly ignored a psy-
chiatrist's advice that Dann be involuntarily committed despite her habitually violent
behavior. Id. at 30. The court found compelling the Corwins' argument that the Was-
sermans' "continuous, ongoing course of conduct ... fostered and promoted known
propensities for aberrant, violent conduct on the part of Laurie Dann." Id. at 32.
120. See supra note 54 and text accompanying notes 87-107.
121. See, e.g., Clark v. McKerley, 126 N.H. 778, 497 A.2d 846 (1985). In Clark, the
court granted summary judgment to the parents of an eighteen-year-old boy because the
parents had no knowledge of his propensity for starting fires. The court stated:
We decline to rest our decision on the son's age. The law of parental liability
to third persons for negligent supervision of a child is undeveloped in this juris-
diction, and we will not take up such a significant issue of first impression in a
case submitted on briefs, when the record reveals an alternative basis for
decision.
Id. at 780, 497 A.2d 847 (citation omitted).
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recognizes a cause of action against parents who fail to act reason-
ably when caring for their dangerous adult child.'22
Determining whether the Wassermans ultimately are held liable,
however, would entail the careful weighing of many public policy
factors.1 23  These factors include: (1) the existence of a special
relation and the resulting degree of control that the Wassermans
exercised over Laurie Dann; (2) the foreseeability of harm to others
from the Wassermans' failure to take protective actions for the
benefit of others; (3) the extent of the burden on the Wassermans;
(4) the consequences to the community; (5) the moral blame at-
tached to the Wassermans' conduct; and (6) the policy of prevent-
ing future harm. 124
These factors were analyzed when the courts first applied section
319 to psychotherapists. In considering the arguments for and
against parental liability, future cases like Corwin must be decided
on whether the duties of a psychotherapist can be analogized to the
duties of a parent.
1. Public Policy Objections to Psychotherapist Liability
Beginning with the Tarasoff dissent, opponents of psychiatrist
liability have argued that the imposition of a duty on psychiatrists
would have detrimental effects on society. 25 They argue that it is
impossible for a psychiatrist to predict which of his patients, if any,
122. "When rendering care and providing services as well as protection to others,
individuals such as the Wassermans must do so in a reasonable manner. The public
policy of the State of Illinois must recognize a cause of action against defendants who fail
to act reasonably when rendering such care." Corwin v. Wasserman, No. 88 L 16369,
court order at 50-51 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 28, 1989) (denial of defendant's motion to dismiss).
123. See Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989). In a suit against a psychiatrist
for negligent release of an involuntarily committed patient who killed a police officer, the
Supreme Court of Colorado stated:
[T]he question of legal duty is a multifaceted issue, the resolution of which ulti-
mately turns on the careful weighing of various factors in the evidentiary con-
text of the case at hand. Although the weighing process, by its very nature, is
hardly calculated to yield categorical and unchanging answers to a problem, it
nonetheless does provide the fairest way we know to deal with the many-faceted
aspects of legal duty.
Id. at 1214.
124. See id. at 1214-15 (list of factors considered in finding a psychiatrist liable for
the acts of an involuntarily committed mental patient); Alva v. Cook, 49 Cal. App. 3d
899, 906-07, 123 Cal. Rptr. 166, 169 (1975) (list of the major considerations when impos-
ing liability on family members).
125. "[T]he majority impedes medical treatment, resulting in increased violence from
- and deprivation of liberty to - the mentally ill." Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 463, 551 P.2d 334, 362, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 42 (1976) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
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will become violent. 126 Since the process of determining potential
violence in a patient is far from exact, opponents allege that hold-
ing a psychiatrist liable under section 319 borders on strict
liability. 127
A second argument against imposing a duty on psychiatrists is
that it will lead to massive confinements of all patients who display
even a remote possibility of violent behavior.2 s The concern is
that psychiatrists, afraid of possible liability, will confine patients
at the expense of their patients' best interests. This contravenes the
current trend in mental health treatment, which encourages dein-
stitutionalization and placing the mentally ill in the "least restric-
tive environment."' 1
29
2. Proponents of Psychotherapist Liability
Proponents of psychotherapist liability, however, do not believe
that the difficulty in predicting dangerousness can justify a psycho-
therapist's total exoneration from liability. 130 Proponents empha-
126. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
127. "Now, confronted by the majority's new duty, the psychiatrist must instantane-
ously calculate potential violence from each patient on each visit." Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d.
at 462, 551 P.2d at 361, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 41 (Clark, J., dissenting); see also Littleton v.
Good Samaritan Hosp., 39 Ohio St. 3d 86, 93, 529 N.E.2d 449, 456 (1988) (extensive list
of citations to support the contention that psychiatrists cannot predict a patient's poten-
tial for violence); Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1339 (D. Colo. 1983) (restricting
the duty imposed by Tarasoff because the subjective nature of a psychiatrist's decisions
demands only a very limited duty to control).
128. "If a psychiatrist knows that he will face liability for failing to foresee a patient's
future violent behavior, the predictable result will be a court-mandated end to out-patient
treatment." Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 39 Ohio St. 3d 86, 94, 529 N.E.2d 449,
456-57 (1988); see also Nova Univ., Inc. v. Wagner, 491 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1986). The
majority in Nova held a private residential rehabilitation center liable for a death caused
by two of its residents who left the premises without permission. In his dissent, Chief
Justice McDonald argued:
The majority opinion imposes an unrealistic duty on and expects too much of
persons and institutions striving to fulfill one of society's great needs.... Ex-
posing those willing to furnish child care services to liability for the actions of
their wards against third parties will further curtail the number and quality of
those willing to participate.
Id. at 1118-19 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
129. See, e.g., Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198, 1218 (Colo. 1989) ("[o]ne of the ex-
press goals of Colorado's statutory program for the care and treatment of the mentally ill
is to restrict the deprivation of the mentally ill person's liberty interests to those situations
where 'less restrictive alternatives are unavailable' ").
130. "The court is not persuaded that the inherent difficulties in predicting danger-
ousness justifies denying the injured party relief regardless of the circumstances. The
standard of care for health professionals adequately takes into account the difficult nature
of the problem." Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 191-92 (D. Neb.
1980).
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size that, like other professionals, a psychotherapist is held liable
only if his conduct differs from the standard of learning and skill
normally possessed by other psychotherapists in the same or simi-
lar locality under the same or similar circumstances. 131 This stan-
dard of care, proponents argue, accounts for the difficulty of the
circumstances; therefore, the imposition of a duty is proper.
This argument prevailed in the case of Perreira v. State.'32 In
Perreira, a psychiatrist was sued for negligence after he released an
involuntarily committed patient who later killed a police officer.
The Supreme Court of Colorado found the imposition of liability
proper despite the difficulty in predicting a patient's violent
propensities. It stated that if a psychiatrist can diagnose and rec-
ommend the need for involuntary commitment, he also should be
able to diagnose dangerousness in the patient. 33
Proponents of psychotherapist liability also reject the argument
that liability will lead to massive confinements.' 34 The decision to
place a mentally ill patient in the least restrictive environment can-
I recognize the reluctance of courts to impose a duty upon psychotherapists
to prevent a patient from doing harm to an unknown third party. Much of this
concern stems from the inherent difficulty, some contend impossibility, in pre-
dicting dangerousness under such circumstances. It is also grounded in the rec-
ognition of the inexactness of diagnosing mental illness as compared with
physical ailments. However, this difficulty alone does not justify barring recov-
ery in all situations.
Cooke v. Berlin, 153 Ariz. 220, 228, 735 P.2d 830, 838 (Ct. App. 1987) (Corcoran, J.,
dissenting).
131. "Within the broad range of reasonable practice and treatment in which profes-
sional opinion and judgment may differ, the therapist is free to exercise his or her own
best judgment without liability; proof, aided by hindsight, that he or she judged wrongly
is insufficient to establish negligence." Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131
Cal. Rptr. at 25.
132. 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989).
133. The court further stated:
If we are to accept the argument that it is simply unfair to expect psychiatrists
to foresee whether the release of an involuntarily committed patient will create
an unreasonable risk of serious bodily harm to others, then we inevitably would
be casting serious doubt on the reliability of virtually all phases of the confine-
ment process.
Id. at 1217 (citation omitted).
134. The court in Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. stated:
The [defendant] contends that imposing liability on a psychotherapist would
conflict with this goal [of placing mental patients in the least restrictive environ-
ment] because therapists would attempt to protect themselves from liability by
placing their patients in a restrictive environment. This argument misinterprets
the nature of the duty imposed upon the therapist. The recognition of this duty
does not make the psychotherapist liable for any harm caused by his patient,
but rather makes him liable only when his negligent treatment of the patient
caused the injury in question.
Lipari, 497 F. Supp. 185, 192 (D. Neb. 1980).
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not be made without regard to the safety of others. A psychiatrist
is expected to balance the various therapeutic considerations con-
cerning the patient's condition against the public dangers that rea-
sonably are apparent.1 35 Every decision that a psychiatrist makes
about the control of a patient must consider the effect that it will
have on the public. The court in Tarasoff concluded that public
policy favoring patient confidentiality must yield when disclosure
will avert danger to others. "The protective privilege ends where
the public peril begins. "136
B. Public Policy and Parental Liability
The Wassermans, like the opponents of psychotherapist liability,
argued that the imposition of a duty on the parents of an adult
child would have devastating effects. 37 For example, parental lia-
bility under section 319 would undermine the current trend away
from confinement of the mentally ill. 138 The concern is that courts
will force families of mentally unstable persons to choose between
institutionalization of family members and potentially unlimited li-
ability for that family member's acts. Ultimately, society at large
would be forced to build, staff, and finance more institutions.
Beyond these economic factors, society would be affected by this
intrusion into personal family decisions. Families would lose the
option of choosing how and where their mentally ill or troubled
adult child will be cared for, unless they are willing to risk full
liability for their child's actions. The danger of imposing liability
on these parents is the possibility that society will punish parents
who are trying to care for their troubled adult children.
Another problem of equating the special relation of psychother-
apist-patient with that of parent-child is the difference in profes-
sional training and skill. A psychotherapist is better educated than
135. "[T]he commendable goal of restoring mentally ill persons to an active and pro-
ductive life... does not serve to relieve a treating psychiatrist of the concomitant respon-
sibility to adequately consider the public interest." Perreira, 768 P.2d at 1218.
136. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 442, 551 P.2d 334, 347,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 27 (1976).
137. Specifically, the Wassermans contended:
If such actions [of concerned parents for a confused daughter] can now be con-
strued after the fact as constituting a custodialship [sic] sufficient to impose a
duty under section 319, the effect upon not only tort law in general, but also,
intra-family relationships could be devastating. Such a decision would send a
message to the parents of all disturbed children that attempts to render aid or
assistance may result in the imposition of civil liability. The law cannot be so
insensitive.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 6, at 22.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
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an ordinary parent in spotting and diagnosing possible dangerous
propensities in a person.
The Corwins, seeking to impose parental liability, argue that
public policy is not served by immunizing parents who allow their
dangerous adult child to go unsupervised. 13 9 They argue that fam-
ily decisions, like those of a psychiatrist, must be balanced against
the effects that those decisions will have on society. The family,
the Corwins asserted, has a general duty not to subject the public
to an unreasonable risk of harm.
Proponents of parental liability also argue that the imposition of
a duty serves the policy of preventing future harm. They feel that
lawsuits such as Corwin v. Wasserman will notify parents that they
will be held liable if they are negligent in the care and control of
their dangerous adult child. In his ruling denying the Was-
sermans' motion to dismiss, Judge O'Connell stated that the Was-
sermans made a "conscious decision to foster known dangerous
aberrant behavior." Judge O'Connell reasoned that "to hold
otherwise encourages irresponsible, negligent conduct."'"
C. A Good Faith Standard
Court intervention into family relationships is not new. Courts
have stated their concern with parental accountability for the acts
of juveniles41 and the duties that parents have to their child who
has reached majority. 42 There also has been a strong public de-
mand recently that parents be held responsible for their children's
misconduct. 143
139. Specifically, the Corwins contend:
One must wonder what policy reasons would require that society stand idly and
impotently by while parents allow a dangerous and mentally disturbed child to
arm herself and commit crime upon crime with impunity while these same par-
ents busily sweep all traces under the carpet. What public policy is served by
permitting parents to defeat efforts to disarm a child when the obvious result of
allowing her to remain armed can only be the ultimate use of those weapons?
Plaintiff's Response, supra note 2, at 25.
140. Corwin v. Wasserman, No. 88 L 16369, court order at 50-51 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June
28, 1989) (denial of defendant's motion to dismiss).
141. "We are certainly concerned about the serious problem of juvenile delinquency
and agreed as to the importance of generating a sense of responsibility on the part of the
parents with respect to the behavior of their children." Parsons v. Smithey, 109 Ariz. 49,
54, 504 P.2d 1272, 1277 (1973).
142. See 2 J. ATKINSON, MODERN CHILD CARE CUSTODY PRACTICE §§ 10.18-10.21
(1986) (discussing court-required support for disabled children who reach majority and
court orders requiring parents to pay for a child's college education).
143. See, e.g., City Targets Parents in Truancy Crackdown, Chicago Tribune, June 11,
1990, § 2, at 1, col. 2. The article outlines a plan by Chicago schools and the Cook
County State's Attorney's Office to fine or imprison parents if their children chronically
1990]
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Against this cry for parental liability there remains the problem
of the social repercussions of holding parents liable. Although the
imposition of liability may be proper in a psychotherapist-patient
relationship, there are vast differences between that relationship
and a parent-child relationship. The imposition of liability against
a psychiatrist can be justified because a psychiatrist holds himself
out as an expert and receives a salary for his opinions and care. A
parent, on the other hand, lacks professional training in parenting.
Therefore, if liability is to be imposed on parents for the acts of
their adult children, courts must consider the difficulty in labeling
parental conduct as negligent. The standard used to evaluate pa-
rental conduct must be very broad. Parents who honestly attempt
to care for their dependent adult children should not be punished
for failing. Proponents of psychotherapist liability argue that the
imposition of liability is proper because the standard of care for
health professionals accounts for the difficult nature of the prob-
lem. I" Parents, however, do not have the luxury of a professional
standard of care, yet the evaluation of their performance is just as
difficult.
To protect parents from unlimited liability, parents should be
found negligent only if they failed to make a good faith effort to
deal with their adult child's conduct prior to the injury. 4 ' Good
faith is an objective standard under which the court would decide
whether the parents' attempts to help their adult child were rea-
sonable under the circumstances. A good faith effort on the part of
a parent should include the balancing of the needs of the child
against the dangerous child's possible effects on the community. A
parent must control and care for an adult child in a manner that
does not jeopardize the public's safety.
For example, consider the case of parents of an emotionally dis-
miss school. When former Cook County State's Attorney Cecil Partee announced the
program, he acknowledged the unlikelihood that any parent would serve a significant jail
term due to a child's truancy, but called the effort a way to "put a little weight on the
parents." Id.; see also Safran, Is It a Crime to Be a Bad Parent?, Woman's Day, May 1,
1990, at 64. The article discusses cases in which parents were held criminally liable for
their children's acts. According to a recent poll, Americans cite "lack of parental super-
vision" as the primary cause of today's rising teenage violence. Almost half of those
polled felt that parents should be held liable for the crimes of their children. Id. at 66.
144. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
145. The good faith standard was used in the psychiatrist liability case of Littleton v.
Good Samaritan Hosp., 39 Ohio St. 3d 86, 529 N.E.2d 449 (1988). The Ohio Supreme
Court was concerned that the usual malpractice standard was not appropriate due to the
subjective nature of the psychiatrist's decisions. Instead, it adopted the professional
judgement standard. Under this standard, a psychiatrist is held liable only if his decision
was not made in good faith. Id. at 100, 529 N.E.2d at 461.
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turbed adult child who has a fascination with fireand a history of
setting fires. The parents, aware of this problem, may elect to care
for the child in their home or institutionalize the child if they feel
that they cannot control him. If the parents decide to keep the
child at home, they must take preventive measures to protect
others from the possibility of a fire. A good faith effort by the
parents would include locking away matches or other items that
could be used by the child to start a fire. This would show that the
parents tried to protect others from the obvious danger that their
child presents. The good faith standard does not demand that
every possible precaution be taken; rather, a parent would be liable
only if reasonable precautions were not taken.
Earlier court decisions imposed liability on parents of minors
when the parents refused to address a serious behavioral problem
brought to their attention by others, or when that child's act could
not have been achieved but for the parent's assistance or inaction.
When imposing liability for the acts of an adult child, the standard
must consider the difficulty that the child's age presents. The good
faith standard would hold parents liable who were negligent in the
care of their child, without punishing parents who tried to help
their child, but failed.
When parents of a dangerous adult child take charge of that
child, they accept the responsibility to protect society from that
child's harmful conduct. Failure to impose this duty would subject
society to an unacceptable risk of harm. In judging a parent's con-
duct, however, the courts must not impose liability when the par-
ent made a good faith effort to control the child. Failure to adopt
this standard of care would subject parents and society to an un-
reasonable burden.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to hold parents liable for the acts of their adult children
there must be proof that the parents: (1) knew that their child had
dangerous propensities; (2) took charge of their child; and (3)
failed to make a good faith effort to protect others from their child.
The relationship of parent and child is too personal and susceptible
to abuse to allow a more stringent standard.
JOAN MORGRIDGE
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